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NATIVE TROOPS FOR OUR COLONIAL POSSESSIONS.

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THE time is at hand for the authorities of the United States to decide a military question of the gravest importance, namely, whether our island possessions in the tropics shall be garrisoned by troops sent from this country, or whether native troops shall be recruited for this purpose. Involved in this question are considerations of climate and subsistence; of vast expenses for transportation of men and food; of expenditures for wages and future pensions; of intricate hospital arrangements involving elaborate establishments, mutually dependent but thousands of miles apart. For the solution of a similar problem in China, the recent experiences of Great Britain at Wei Hai Wei are luminous in purpose and results, and most timely for immediate application to this country's needs, especially in the Philippines. It is worth while to study with the utmost care what England has done with her native battalion at Wei Hai Wei.

Forty miles to the eastward of Cheefoo, where in the year 1895, with the guns of the Russian fleet clearing for action, the treaty of Shimonoseki was ratified by China and Japan, lies the harbor of Wei Hai Wei. It is a bay formed by a sharp break in the rugged coast line, and is protected at its entrance by the island of Liu Kung Tao. Nature has been liberal to China in the matter of shelters to commerce, robbing the eastern shores of the Pacific that she might furnish the western with magnificent harbors and bays. Of these Wei Hai Wei takes easily primary rank, with its capacious, deep, mud-bottomed harbor, and its natural defences.

Wei Hai Wei (pronounced as though it were written Way High Way) was founded in the reign of the Emperor Hung Wu, of the last (Ming) dynasty, about A. D. 1399. The third syl-

lable—for there are three syllables rather than three words—means a walled military post; the first, though homophonous, means to awe, or, as we would say, to over-awe; the middle member of the name is the word for sea. Thus Wei Hai Wei is the “Terror of the Sea,” so called because it was used as a base from which to subdue the pirates that infested the neighboring seas.

In the year 1883, the first steps were taken to fortify Wei Hai Wei, as a base for military operations; but the war with the French in 1884 led to the abandonment of the work before much had been accomplished. When peace came, the interrupted activity was renewed, and the rapidly growing northern ocean squadron of the Chinese navy found here its summer rendezvous, the harbor at Port Arthur, or Lü Shun Kōn, as the Chinese call it, being far too small to shelter more than a few ships at one time. Later, two lighthouses were erected. Forts were built under German superintendence and supplied with guns by Krupp, whose agent, the late General Schnell, was instructor in gunnery in the Chinese garrison. Money was spent liberally, and excellent work was done in the way of fortifying the place, for the Mandarins got their “squeeze” not by “jerry building,” but by purchasing less than was provided for, and by drawing money for the expenses of battalions which never existed. And when they did go in for “jerry building,” their methods were radical. The presiding genius of the day, Li Hung Chang, found on his last inspection, made just before the Japanese sank the “Kow Shing” and so opened the war, that a fort on the far east end of the bay had been built of wood. Mighty was the wrath of the great Li, and frightful the consternation of the two generals responsible for the fraud, fellow-provincials and protégés of Li himself. They were instructed to rebuild at once, and with stone. But whence the funds? These were found in a way that was simplicity itself. A battalion was estimated for, and although it never existed save on paper, money was drawn for its maintenance. Stone was obtained speedily from the wonderful and inexhaustible granite quarries of Shih Tao, in the Shan Tung promontory, and there it lies to-day, for the Japanese war put a stop to further fortifications. And when the Chinese Government recently turned the place over to the British, the local authorities had no knowledge of the existence of this material, which was boldly claimed by a disgraced general.

On November 21, 1894, Port Arthur fell into the hands of the Japanese, who shortly began to turn their attention to Wei Hai Wei. On the 20th of January following, twenty-five thousand men were landed on the sheltered shore of Yung Cheng Bay under cover of the guns of the Japanese fleet. From this place to Wei Hai Wei, a march of more than forty miles was necessary over a country innocent of a road wider than a pack mule track, and on February 12, 1895, Wei Hai Wei was evacuated by the Chinese. Of their fleet, some were sunk and some captured. Admiral Ting, a brave officer, willing to fight, but under orders not to leave the harbor, chagrined and heart-broken, swallowed opium after signing articles of capitulation. The country around was occupied speedily and effectually by the Japanese. The treaty of Shimonoseki provided that Wei Hai Wei should remain in the hands of the Japanese until certain stipulations should be carried out, and for nearly four years Japan maintained a large garrison there, but on July 24, 1898, the Japanese flag disappeared from the harbor. For a brief time the Chinese emblem displayed its dragon swallowing the sun, shortly to find a companion in the Union Jack, and finally to disappear a few months later, leaving the British nominally, as they had been actually, in control of Wei Hai Wei, their new "sphere of influence."

It is on these historic shores that the experiment of transforming the Chinaman into a modern fighting machine has been successfully made by the newcomers, while the military experts of the world are watching the results with increasing interest. And since the policy of our own country to retain permanent possession of our new insular colonies now seems established, we, too, should be especially interested in the experiment from a military as well as an economic point of view. Wherever the flag of England floats, there you will find her defenses maintained by native guardians. The flower of her army is not consumed in colonial garrisons. In India, the Gurkhas and Sikhs, officered by Englishmen, form her military reliance. In West Africa the Houssas are her defenders. In Egypt the Baggaras, transformed by the skill of Kitchener, rout the forces of the Mahdi. In the Windward and Leeward Islands and Jamaica, native regiments (blacks) are employed exclusively; so, too, in Australia and Canada, her soldiers are mostly native born, and in South Africa, until the outbreak of the present war, Zulus, supplemented by a

small contingent of English troops, maintained her defense and security. Where, indeed, would England be to-day were it not for these native forces guarding her colonial empire, while her own soldiers are engaged in the Transvaal hostilities? Quick in her perception of this great advantage, she no sooner got possession of her new sphere in China than she at once set about organizing a means of defense by utilizing the material at hand, knowing that, if successful, she could at once eliminate two of the greatest problems besetting an army on a foreign shore, that of acclimatization, and of subsistence, with the attendant dangers of climatic and epidemic diseases.

It was my good fortune, on a recent visit to Wei Hai Wei, to meet Colonel C. H. Bower, R. A.—to whose genius has been intrusted the serious experiment of transforming native Chinese from mild-mannered Coolies to modern soldiers—to witness many of their drills, and to get from Colonel Bower's own lips his account of the work. He approached the task with many misgivings; but after six months of patient work his views changed radically. The First Battalion, Chinese Regiment, recruited during the past year, numbered at the time of my visit three hundred and sixty men, all from the Shan Tung Province, where the finest specimens of physical development of China are to be found. These men are enlisted for three years, under the regular provisions of the British Army Act, for service in any part of the world. They have been selected with the greatest care. The average height is five feet eight inches, with a chest development of thirty-eight inches, a standard higher than that of the regular British army to-day. Three companies of one hundred and twenty men each were well advanced in training. The organization of the company in detail is similar to that in the United States Army. All the commissioned officers are British, but the non-commissioned staff, with the exception of one sergeant-major, one color-sergeant, one orderly-room clerk and one armor-sergeant, are Chinese.

It is certainly wonderful what a few months' hard work accomplished in "licking these 'rookies' into shape." Colonel Bower assured me that while originally he was far from being impressed with the idea of making soldiers of the Chinese—indeed, he was decidedly prejudiced against even such an attempt—experience had convinced him of his error, and that he was now

becoming an optimist. The initial processes of drilling were tedious and required much patience on the part of the drill-master; but the men soon learned to respect their superiors and became attached personally to them; and the officers, having once gained the confidence of the men, could do almost anything with them. Discipline was maintained with but little use of the guard-room, and drunkenness was unknown.

These Chinese recruits are remarkably respectful, orderly, docile and learn their tactics well; but the greatest patience has to be exercised with them until they fully understand their positions and are brought to a realization of their responsibilities, of which, in their early days, they seem to have no understanding. For more than six thousand years the Chinaman has followed his own method, and it is difficult to make him realize the importance of precision in military affairs. For instance, when a leave of absence for seventy-two hours is given to him, he will return perhaps in ninety-six, thinking it is all right. What's the difference? He cannot be made to see it; "came back all right; three days all the same four, so long as he did come back." But when put in the guard-room for a week and made to do extra labor, his sleeping sense of duty is awakened and he does not repeat the offense. Notwithstanding that the drills at Wei Hai Wei have been very severe, desertions were unknown, although opportunity could be found easily, as the British concession or sphere of influence extends only ten miles inland. The uniform of the troops is rather picturesque: straw hats in the extreme heat of summer, to be replaced by turbans in winter; khaki blouses and breeches for the summer, to be exchanged for rough Irish frieze in winter; red cummerbunds, and putties instead of leggings, with the regular artillery boot of the British Army.

Colonel Bower was especially enthusiastic over the results of his men's musketry practice at the rifle butts. At the time of my visit, they had been trained for short range work only, one, two and three hundred yards; but their scores had been exceedingly gratifying, better even than those of the average British soldier after an equal amount of practice, to the great astonishment of all the officers of the regiment.

The cost of these troops to the British Government is another surprise. Their ration consists of one catty of rice (1.33 pounds), one-third catty of flour daily, and one pound of meat

once a week. The cost of this to the British Government is \$2.15, Mexican, a month; the soldiers' pay is \$8.00, Mexican, a month, making the entire cost to the Government for the soldier and his subsistence \$10.15, Mexican, or \$5.00 gold, a month. All vegetables and luxuries are purchased by the soldier at his own expense. The health of the men was excellent. Since the organization of the regiment, there had not been one death or a serious case of intestinal disease, although the period has included the most inclement season of the year. Colonel Bower was convinced that with a year or two more of training, his men would be equal to any soldiers in the world.

At the time of my visit, the battalion had its first experience in fighting fire. A conflagration occurred in the old city. On such occasions it is the custom of the natives to sit by supinely, watching the progress of the flames, even though a whole city may be in a blaze, or to indulge in looting. But the English officers were on the scene quickly with the Chinese battalion, a fire-brigade was organized promptly, water was passed up in buckets and the fire put under control, while the populace stood by and marvelled.

Within a year of their enlistment, these troops successfully stood the crucial test of leading a charge. In a sharp action with a vastly superior force of Boxers, the same who are now menacing the safety of the Chinese Empire in the Provinces of Shan Tung and Pi Chi Li, and about Tien-Tsin and the Imperial City, Peking, the Chinese Battalion, with their British officers, quickly routed the enemy, killing sixty and capturing a large quantity of arms. Their own casualties amounted to only two, both British officers, who were wounded. Thus they demonstrated beyond cavil their fidelity and loyalty to the new flag they had sworn to uphold, even when their opponents were their own countrymen.

Hitherto, we have been accustomed to laugh at the soldiery of China; but, indeed, the fact that her soldiery is a laughing stock on account of lack of training and bad generalship, proves nothing against the Chinaman's courage. Fortunately there can be no question of his innate bravery. For a consideration, or when convinced that he is right, he puts the fear of death entirely out of his mind. Like the negro, the Egyptian or the Malay, all the Chinaman wants is the inspiration and leadership of resolute

white officers. Conspicuous examples of their personal bravery are not lacking in the official reports of our own officers serving in the Philippines, notably those of Lieutenant Batson, of Major Bell, of Captain Sawtelle of General McArthur's staff, of Colonel Powell and Captain Durfee of the Seventeenth Infantry, and of Major Shields, Surgeon of the California Volunteers. My own observations on the firing line confirm these opinions. The Chinese drivers or litter bearers were as absolutely unconcerned under fire as though out in a snow-storm, and they obeyed their orders implicitly.

An incident illustrating the bravery of the coolie is narrated by Major Putnam Bradlee Strong. It occurred at the battle of Malolos, in Luzon. An American soldier had fallen at the front; two coolies had rushed forward with their litter, consisting of a little hammock swung from a pole, and were bringing the man back to the dressing station, when a bullet pierced the thigh of one of the litter-bearers. He continued on, however, as though nothing had happened, until he deposited his charge beside the improvised operating table. Not until some time later was it found that the coolie was wounded severely and suffering intense pain. He endured it all with the patience and stoicism of his race, and expressed surprise that attention should be bestowed upon him at all; he had expected to be left by the wayside.

That the yellow and black races make excellent fighting material, when properly officered by whites, has been proved conclusively in innumerable instances. In our own army at San Juan Hill, the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth United States Infantry and Tenth Cavalry, negro troops, led by their gallant white American officers, did as effective work as any men, regulars or volunteers, on the field. Nor did their heroism cease there. Later, when that more dreaded enemy, yellow fever, appeared in every camp, and when volunteers were called for to nurse the sick and dying and to bury the dead, it was these men of the negro regiments who responded to the call, notwithstanding that their numbers had been terribly reduced in the battle only a few days before, and the fatal pestilence was raging in their own ranks. One hundred and twelve of these martyrs succumbed to the disease, but they quavered not in the hour of danger.

Nor is this record for fearlessness in the so-called inferior races confined to our own army. What did Kitchener do with the

Egyptian peasants who for centuries had been regarded as menials and cowards? By tactics similar to those now being followed by Colonel Bower with the Chinese at Wei Hai Wei, he transformed them into cavalrymen, who not only successfully resisted but charged and broke the bloodthirsty followers of the Mahdi and defeated them with terrible slaughter. Fifteen years ago the idea of making a soldier of an Egyptian would have been ridiculed as a practical joke by military men. Training and the inspiration of leadership won the victories, and the Egyptian soldier of to-day has his place in history.

The experience of "Chinese" Gordon at the taking of the Taku forts in 1860 is eloquent in its showing of the individual bravery of the Chinaman. Large numbers of coolies were pressed into his service as cooks, litter-bearers and for transportation purposes. Arriving at the moats surrounding the forts, these slaves of duty seized the scaling ladders, rushed into the water nearly neck-deep, and in the face of a galling rifle and artillery fire placed the ladders on their shoulders from man to man, thus forming a continuous bridge supported by human pillars, and let the British army walk over their heads to the other side of the moat. Then, rushing from the water with their ladders, they ran to the walls of the fortresses, and were the first to scale their ramparts. Thus was courage inspired, and thus did it become contagious, even as panic and disaster would have resulted had the leadership failed.

Nor has Spain been without experience in the use of native troops in her colonies, in the very place where this urgent military question must be met and solved by the United States, namely, in the Philippines. One of the most formidable elements of the Spanish Army in the Philippines, upon which Spain placed strong reliance, was her native Filipino troops, of whom, when Manila fell, she had about five thousand. They were among her best disciplined and bravest troops, familiar with the country, its warfare, its dangers and its ambuscades, in excellent health and thoroughly acclimated, speaking the language of the country, free from danger of tropical diseases, and subsisting on native foods. Our failure to secure them for service under the American flag was promptly taken advantage of by the wily Aguinaldo, who, upon condition of their swearing fealty to him and entering his army, promised them immunity from their countrymen and

reward for their service. It was only a short time before the entire force was under his control, almost every soldier being made an officer in the Filipino ranks. It was in this way that Aguinaldo was enabled to create the disciplined array that was destined so long to cope with our army of over fifty thousand men.

In view of our failure to secure the trained Spanish-Filipino soldiers, and considering the suspicion that exists, and will probably continue to exist, toward us among the natives of the islands, the experiment of Great Britain with the Chinese Battalion at Wei Hai Wei is of signal concern to the United States. In our Philippine possessions there are already more than one hundred thousand Chinese, who form by far the most industrious class of the inhabitants. The Chinese mestizo (half Chinese and half Filipino) is acknowledged to be superior to the Eurasian, or to the mestizos of Oriental cross, Japanese, Hindoo or Bornese. Many of them are wealthy bankers and merchants. Others are engaged as compradors and clerks, banking houses employing them almost to the exclusion of other nationalities, on account of their quick wit, sterling honesty, industry and individual merit. As in the Hawaiian Islands, they form the most valuable element of the population. The Chinese-Hawaiian half-caste is the keenest business man and the most industrious citizen to be found in those islands. The exclusion of the Chinese laborer in that land will do inestimable damage in retarding industrial and commercial development. Despite his fanaticism when directed by ignorant rulers, he has shown his superiority over other Orientals in his untiring industry, his domesticity, and his honesty.

In the large foreign hongs of China and Japan he is the trusted employee in places requiring responsibility. When put in competition with the Bornese, the Filipino, the Singalese, the Hawaiian, the Japanese or the Indian, he invariably wins, as may be seen by his rise from poverty to wealth and influence in the cities of Singapore, Calcutta, Sandakan, Manila, Honolulu or Yokohama. It is time the world recognized that in the great race of civilization, and the greater race for the survival of the fittest, the nation that has preserved the integrity of its government for over six thousand years, that has witnessed the rise and fall of the civilization of Chaldea, Egypt, Greece and Rome; that can claim the discovery of the compass, of gunpowder, the game of chess, and the printing press, is more to be feared for its vir-

tues than its vices. The presence of the Chinaman in the Philippines, as in the Hawaiian Islands, will do more to promote the industrial development of these colonies than any other single factor. His exclusion was a diplomatic blunder to be rated with our failure to secure the army of Filipinos trained by Spain, and the discharge of the Civil Guard of Manila, five hundred strong, all of whom immediately entered the service of Aguinaldo; and the irrational rationing of our troops, which did, and is still doing, so much to invalid and decimate our army.

To attribute to climate the diseases of the tropics is an error due to ignorance and custom. The vast majority of ailments credited to climate have their origin in the use of improper foods, overfeeding, or the abuse of stimulants.

During the past two years, it has been my misfortune to see two great armies—one in our own Southern country, Cuba and Porto Rico, and one in the Philippine Islands—largely invalidated, through culpable ignorance or neglect, by improperly subsisting the troops. To the eternal disgrace of our medical and commissary departments it will be remembered that, when entire regiments were suffering from stomach and intestinal catarrhs, from diarrhoea and kindred ailments (and I have seen more than seventy-five per cent. of an entire command in this condition at one time), they were subsisted on a ration of rich meats, pork and beans, tomatoes and other foods that aggravated the diseases, crowded the hospital tents, and left the men weak and emaciated, so that their return to health was a prolonged struggle. Taps and the last volley were often the only reward many a poor soldier received for his patriotism.

As represented in caloric units, the ration supplied to the American soldier in tropical lands amounted to thirty-eight hundred units, while that given to an English prize-fighter in a temperate zone, when training for the ring, amounts to only twenty-eight hundred caloric units. It is an old saying that "it is the ration that wins the battle." As furnished to the soldier, the ration was an excellent winter food, rich in the elements requisite for respiration under a low temperature; but for a tropical land, the enormous excess of carbon furnished by it to the lungs, over and above that which they could dispose of, imposed upon the liver and kidneys additional duties of elimination, producing congestions, fermentation and catarrhs, dyspepsia and lithæmia,

glycosuria and phosphaturia, interfering with metabolism, and creating conditions favorable to bacteriological development, together with almost the entire train of diseases which have crowded our army hospitals. In phosphaturia especially, the nervous system is deprived of the salts necessary for its proper function, which privation not infrequently results in mental disturbances that may end in suicide or insanity. How little the heat is directly responsible for these cases may be inferred from the extreme rarity of sunstroke in the tropics.

Dr. John Ordronaux, Emeritus Professor of Medical Jurisprudence in the College of Physicians and Surgeons, served with distinction thirty-eight years ago in our War of the Rebellion as a volunteer surgeon. It was at that time that the famous saying, "Beans killed more than bullets," arose. In round numbers the mortality from bullets, directly and indirectly, was one hundred thousand, while that from disease was five hundred thousand, or five to one. Commenting on this fact thirty-seven years ago, "that the ration served our troops in the South was the same in winter as in summer," Dr. Ordronaux said:

"By proper disposition of his diet, man lives as healthfully under the Equator as under the Pole. The East Indian with his rice and yams, and the Esquimo with his seal blubber and putrid fish, are both healthy enough in their respective climates, but let them once change residences without changing their diet, and what would be the consequence? The Esquimo would be attacked with putrid fever, and the West Indian would die of inanition.

"We perceive from this the absolute necessity of modifying all forms of diet in such a way as to accommodate them to the physiological requirements of varying seasons. For habit is not acquirable as against laws of chemical combination, and no man can become habituated to doing that with impunity, which, being a violation of the physiological laws of his system, is, by its frequent admonitions of pain, notifying him of the evil about to overtake him.

"As the ration bill now stands, it presents us with too contracted a form of diet for continued use. It abounds in fibrine, gluten, and fat, without, however, a sufficiency in starch, mucilage, gelatin, and acids. Aromatic herbs and spices, without which health cannot for any length of time be preserved, particularly in hot climates or seasons, are entirely omitted, while fat pork, an article contra indicated in summer both by the state of the appetite and the physiological necessities of the system, stands as the sheet anchor of its animal food."

And of what avail was this prophetic warning? The ration table of the United States Army in the Spanish-American War was substantially the same as that during the Rebellion.

From the dawn of history experience has shown that, in time of war, disease was a far more deadly foe to an army than the bullets of an enemy. In the War of the Crimea the French lost in killed 21,000, and from disease 100,000, or about one from bullets and wounds to five from disease. The English losses in that dreadful campaign ran a little higher, the proportion between fatalities from bullets and wounds and that from disease being about one to six.

In our Civil War, about the same proportions were maintained, one to five. In round numbers, 100,000 men fell on the field or died from wounds, and 500,000 perished in hospital wards from the more fatal enemy—disease.

But it has been reserved for the Spanish-American War to cause a blush of shame and indignation at the apathy and stupidity that has permitted preventable diseases to play such havoc with the army. In the campaign, the actual hostilities of which lasted from July 1st to August 12th, about six weeks, the mortality from bullets and wounds amounted to 268, while that from disease reached the appalling number of 3,862, or about fourteen to one. With proper subsistence and sanitation these proportions, for such a short service, should have been reversed.

With our military hospitals in the Philippines still crowded, despite the constant relief of their wards by shiploads returning on transports, and with the decimating policy of irrationally subsisting the troops still in force, it behooves the United States to follow the example of England at the earliest possible moment and to resort to the only reasonable course left open for the maintenance of her army in the Orient, namely the utilization of native troops. Most authorities agree that it will require a garrison of at least forty thousand men to maintain order in the Philippines even after peace is declared, but I coincide with General Lawton, who told me that he thought it would require many more than that number to bring order out of chaos, to establish law in the various provinces and to maintain its complete supremacy.

The United States now has twenty-five regiments of volunteers in the Philippines, whose term of service will expire on June 30, 1901. Most of the enlisted men will wish to return at the expiration of that time, some sooner, while some will be willing to serve longer. A majority of the commissioned officers would welcome the opportunity to retain their places permanently. I

would suggest that, at the earliest possible date, such of the enlisted men, not exceeding one-third, as desire their discharge on account of sickness or for other causes be allowed to leave the service. Then, from the third battalions of each regiment, let all the enlisted men, excepting a few non-commissioned officers in each company, be transferred to the other two battalions, thus filling them to their full strength. Enlist one battalion of Chinese, or of native friendly Filipinos (Macabees or Ilocanos), to each regiment, making the composition of each regiment two battalions of white and one battalion of native troops, with white officers throughout, and a certain proportion of white non-commissioned officers in each native company. At such time as the authorities deem advisable, transform a second battalion of white to native troops in a similar manner. Then, when the proper time arrives, and the success of the move is demonstrated, transform the third battalion of each regiment, and, as circumstances may justify, replace such of the white non-commissioned officers as may seem best for the interests of the service by native non-commissioned officers, **but keep white commissioned officers first, last and all the time.**

Published statistics recently furnished by Congress state that the cost of the army in the Philippines in the last year was about \$150,000,000. It is easily within reason to declare that each fighting man costs the Government more than one thousand dollars, gold, a year, for pay, subsistence, cost of transportation service and medical attendance, without any calculation for his future pension claim. The pay of the American soldier in the Philippines is sixteen dollars, gold, a month. His ration costs far more, when the enormous wastage and cost of transportation is calculated. It is no uncommon incident for entire cargoes of beef to be lost in transportation across the Pacific. I know of three such instances last summer. And in calculating the cost of the American soldier, no mention has been made of the expenses of hospitals with their medical staffs, nurses, orderlies, helpers, etc., all of which add enormously to the expenditure.

The native Chinaman or Filipino can be enlisted in unlimited numbers for ten dollars a month, and can be subsisted for four dollars more. Additional expenditures for transportation, etc., might cost two dollars more, making a total of sixteen dollars a month, or not more than two hundred dollars, gold, a year, or

about one-fifth of our present expenditure, and with no danger from an everlasting pension claim in the future.

In an interview with Li Hung Chang, at his palace in Peking, some months prior to the outbreak of hostilities in China, he assured me that China would interpose no objection to the enlistment of her subjects in the American army. But if, in the present crisis, such recruits are not considered desirable, there are many friendly Filipinos to be substituted. Great Britain recruits her ranks from various tribes or castes in India, and tribal hatreds are often utilized in the pacification of outbreaks among the natives. The same policy can be advantageously followed by us in the Philippines, where the friendly tribes of Ilocanos and Macabees are the implacable foes of the rebellious Tagals.

England has a great advantage over the United States in colonial government and in colonial military affairs, in that there is not always a home party in opposition wanting to apply the Constitution to the natives, telling the discontents that as soon as their party gets control all complaints and wrongs will be rectified. The home Government acts as a unit and with a consistency that challenges the admiration of the world.

It remains to be seen whether, by the liberal utilization of native troops, we shall save the flower of our army for service at home, and preserve it from degrading conditions that, alas! too often, are brought to this country by returning troops. And it also remains to be seen whether the country shall be spared the depletion of its Treasury through extravagant expenditures caused by improvident military administration leading to enormous pension claims. The Spanish war has resulted in the filing of over twenty-five thousand of these claims already. Who can say what the number will be when those resulting from the Philippines campaign are recorded?

LOUIS L. SEAMAN.